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 Much theory of religion—too much, in my view—involves speculation on the 
origins of religion. To illustrate this problem to undergraduate students, I have often 
taken a few precious moments of class time to play a clip from the classic comedy 
routine 2000 and Thirteen, by Carl Reiner and Mel Brooks (Reiner and Brooks 1973; 
cf. Brooks and Reiner 1997, 2010-2011 [transcription below, from the original 
audio, is mine]). It is a truism that high school graduates are fundamentally 
unprepared for college work. To wit, many students will not have heard about the 
2000-plus year-old man (Mel Brooks) whose wisdom has been brought to the public 
thanks to his intrepid interviewer (Carl Reiner): 
Reiner: “Did you live before man believed in the Almighty?” 
Brooks: “Oh, yeah, a few years before, yeah….” 
Reiner: “Did you believe in anything? Did you believe in any superior being?” 
Brooks: “Yes, a guy Phil.” 
Phil, we are told, was revered by virtue of the fact that he was the strongest member 
of the tribe. They prayed to Phil, pleading with him not to take their eyes out or hurt 
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them at all, whether this way or that way. But Phil’s reign as the leader of the tribe—
and as the recipient of these earliest human acts of devotion—did not last long. One 
day, Phil was struck by lightning. This historic event led to a sudden realization:  
Brooks: “We looked up and said, ‘There’s something bigger than Phil!’”  
There’s something marvelously funny about this. Freud’s Totem and Taboo—
only half-remembered, if that—is comedically skewered. No need for psycho-
analytic recovery of the repressed Oedipal complex. Rather, a memorable and 
remembering old man can tell us directly how it really happened. The fear of death 
did indeed motivate the creation of religion after all. But the death of the fearful 
brute was brought about, bloodlessly, by none other than the almighty himself. The 
simplicity of the realization—“There’s something bigger than Phil”—brings us 
straight from the cavemen to monotheism. And the whole tale is told by a 2000-year 
old Jewish man, in English no less, albeit heavily accented. Mais bien sûr! 
  There are important lessons that any student of religion can draw from this 
routine. The first thing that confronts us is our wish-fulfillment: the origins of 
religion as remembered by a caveman who was there. We should only be so lucky. 
The second thing that confronts us is the conflation of time: Obviously, 2000 years 
ago doesn’t bring us back far enough—but why should we think that the Hebrew 
Bible or Greek myth brings us back much further? The third thing that confronts us 
is that there is no primal murder, just the fortuitous (and bloodless) demise of the 
first alpha-male. The fourth thing that confronts us is the absence of sacrifice. 
Brooks’s early Phil-worshippers invented prayer straight away, while Phil was still 
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incarnate. Finally, we are confronted with the intelligibility of all this: does this 
make any less sense than Freud? Or Frazer? Or Girard? And what then? 
  Of course, there are many ways in which Girard’s own theory on the origins 
of religion is ever more sophisticated and important. The first is, perhaps, its serious 
and well-meaning purpose. Girard’s work is, principally, dedicated to elucidating the 
nexus between religion and violence. This is the one thing to appreciate above all in 
Girard: his desire to explain the violence-religion nexus. Perhaps nothing can be 
more important, and it was he who called attention to this question, back in the 
early 1970s. This was before the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This was when the faces 
of international terrorist organizations were (largely) secular. This was when no 
one else was watching. 
 There are other matters of importance too: Girard’s sympathy, appropriately 
enough is with the lost innocent victims of history, and surely, there have been too 
many. Finally, Girard’s theory is also nothing if not intellectually ambitious. Myths 
from the Hebrew Bible, the New Testament, and the Ancient Greeks are all 
scrutinized; even Vedic religion (see below) doesn’t escape his interest in the end. 
Looking back on Girard’s achievements, critics like myself (Klawans 2005, 22-26; 
2007) must admire the moral and intellectual ambitions of Girard’s work. 
 We critics should also appreciate Girard’s important self-corrections. His 
2004 essay Le Sacrifice, which appeared in an English translation in 2011 (Girard 
2004/2011), includes some rather significant efforts at redirection and even 
expansion of his theory. Against those who have accused him of largely ignoring 
non-western evidence (Smart 1980, 174) the 2004 essay is focused heavily on the 
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Indian tradition (cf. Girard 2011, 64). Indeed the volume is dedicated to the noted 
French Indologist Sylvain Lévi (1863-1935; on Lévi’s influence on Henri Hubert, 
Marcel Mauss, and Émile Drukheim, see Strenski, 1997a, 82–148; 1997b, 526–33). 
But more importantly, Girard claims to find in the Indic materials evidence that 
confirms his mimetic theory: “Far from unduly privileging the Western tradition and 
awarding it a monopoly on the knowledge and repudiation of blood sacrifice, 
mimetic analysis recognizes the comparable but never truly identical trains in the 
Indian tradition” (Girard 2004/2011, xii; cf. 30-61 and 98-101n.9). 
Against those who accuse him of denigrating the Hebrew Bible or subsequent 
Judaism (cf. Klawans 2005, 25-26), Girard is at great pains in his 2004 essay to find, 
in the Hebrew Bible, passages pointing positively toward the ultimate revelation of 
truth in the Gospels. He speaks of the Judeo-Christian tradition (Girard 2004/2011, 
61, 80-81, 87), and the revelatory truth of the Bible as a whole (Old Testament 
included): “the emergence of this truth” [mimetic theory] “begins well before the 
Gospels in the Hebrew Bible, which already rehabilitates a fair number of 
scapegoats…” (74; cf. Doran and Girard 2008, 30-31). And against those who claim 
his approach “is the product of religious inspiration,” Girard has this to say (Girard 
2004/2011, 33):  
It suffices to read my books with a minimum of attention to prove the falsity 
of this accusation. Mimetic theory renders and account of sacrifice and 
archaic religion in terms of a purely natural force, hypermimeticism. Because 
it exacerbates rivalries, this hypermimeticism destroys the dominance 
patters in animal societies, but it replaces them, in the paroxysm of violence 
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it releases, with another natural restraint, the mechanism of victimization, 
the founding murder that produces ritual sacrifice in its turn. In this genesis, 
there is not the slightest recourse to transcendence or to anything 
“irrational.” 
Yet Le Sacrifice is authored by one and the same Girard. The consistencies 
override any evolutions, and the charges raised earlier—from selectivity to 
religiosity—continue to hit their mark. If Vedic sources can play a role, theirs is akin 
to the partial revelations to be found in the Hebrew Bible: “The authors of the 
Brahmanas are the universal specialists of sacrifice. We must not conclude from all 
we read here that they demistify the myths in the same way that mimetic theory 
does” (53). The critique of sacrifice is to be found, rather, in the Upanishads and 
above all in Buddhism (53; 87-95), which becomes the new and partial parallel to 
the New Testament evidence most favored by Girard. There are still winners and 
losers; and the winners are Christian texts and those that prefigure them, echo 
them, or otherwise resemble them. 
Despite Girard’s kind words for the Hebrew Bible, the Gospels remain 
supremely revelatory: “What mimetic theory shows is that the singularity of 
Christianity is literally demonstrable” (67). This, at the end of the day, is what 
renders Girard’s work both religious and Christian. It is not that his theory supposes 
the truth of a traditional Christian theology, Catholic or otherwise (it most obviously 
does not; see Strenski 1993, 202-16). It is not that his theory rests on direct claims 
of religious inspiration or asserts the presence of God in Christ or the absence of 
such a God for archaic folk. Girard’s theory was, is and remains Christian for its 
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unquestioned and unproblematized assertion of the uniquely revelatory nature of 
the Gospels—a fact that, for the rest of us, demonstrates nothing other than his 
choice to revere these texts above all others. 
Along the way toward his praise of the Gospels, evidence that is potentially 
disconfirming—a myth that is missing one aspect of the mechanism or the other—is 
still dealt with by what can only be described as a sleight of hand. When a 
definitional aspect of Girard’s mimetic scheme—the false accusation against the 
scapegoated victim—is missing in the Hymn to Parusha (Rig Veda 10.90) Girard 
simply avers that it “is no longer present” (2004/20011, 44). No matter: what’s 
missing in one place can be found in the other, confirming the universal truth of the 
mechanism. This is the kind of argument that can persuade the believer. Am I being 
“disrespectful” (see below) if I point out that the rest of us—mere scholars we—
generally are not permitted to do this? I am reminded of Edmund Leach’s classic 
critique of Mircea Eliade: “A writer who is prepared to generalize in this grandiose 
way is not going to be put out by a mere discordance of evidence or the lack of it” 
(1966). Here too Girard’s approach can be characterized as religious—even 
Christian, albeit in Gnostic ways: Girard reveals once and for all the truth that the 
pre-Christian (and non-Christian) evidence conceals (Dunnill 1996, 114; Klawans 
2007, 4). 
 And there is still another problem, one that surfaces in every Girardian work 
from Violence and the Sacred to Sacrifice. It’s a problem that boils down to the too-
frequent repetition of a single, rather simple, word. That word is not “sacrifice,” 
“mimetic,” or “desire.” The word I mean is “everywhere.” “Everywhere, imitation is 
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the engine of rivalry” (2011, 17). “The survival of communities everywhere would 
be under constant threat if sacrifice did not intervene…” (23). “The tendency to 
minimize and even suppress violence is at work always and everywhere in the rites, 
and only an attentive examination can discover the traces of what Durkheim called 
the ‘volcanic origin of the religious’” (39). “We find [ritual sacrifice] everywhere and 
in forms too nearly alike to justify the theory that it is a pure fiction, a pseudo-
institution” (62). “…the single victim is everywhere and always believed to be more 
violent, more dangerous than the mob that is the true source of violence…” (78; cf. 
also 98, 101). In this respect too, Girard’s recent reformulation echoes Violence and 
the Sacred (1977, [e.g.,:] 52, 57, 78, 109, 242). 
Only God can be everywhere—if there is such a god. Girard’s assertions of 
omnipresence are not academic. In their self-affirming insistence on an eternal, 
general truth, these proclamations are more religious than they are anything else I 
can think of. For the non-believer, Girard’s mimetic mechanism certainly isn’t 
everywhere. In all of those places where it is partially present—obscured, 
concealed, repressed, or otherwise just lacking this or that—the mimetic 
mechanism is, objectively, absent, in part or in whole (compare Jonathan Z. Smith’s 
comments as transcribed in Hamerton-Kelly 1987, 211-212, and see also Traube 
1979, 39-40). Girard’s scapegoat mechanism can be discerned in full, where it is 
otherwise incomplete, only by faith.  
But Sandor Goodhart and Ann Astell ask nevertheless: what if it is 
everywhere? (Goodhart and Astell 2011, 20): 
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What if his theory does account for all instances of the ways in which cultures 
manage run-away mimetic behavior—across the board? What if it discloses 
the foundation of hominization? Should we cast it aside because it is too 
successful, because it works every time we invoke it?   
But this too is sleight of hand. The theory only accounts for everything by shrewdly 
explaining away why the mechanism is only in part visible here and in part visible 
there. It only works every time for those who believe and are willing to fill in the 
gaps according to what the theory supplies. Skeptics have been complaining long 
and hard, loud and clear. We just don’t find the theory convincing even for the Bible, 
or even for the Greeks. The claim to work everywhere confirms not the theory’s 
potential power, but its assertive audacity. If one asks: What if it the theory does 
account for everything? Why not ask: What if the Gospels are in fact uniquely 
revelatory? I know I need not answer the latter question; I should not have to 
answer the former either. 
I think we find here yet another way in which Girard’s work is religious. For 
his followers, Girard’s words are authoritative, proof or not. He is, just as Ivan 
Strenski said of Eliade, a guru—a “privileged knower” (Strenski 1993, 179). For his 
followers, Girard is one who commands respect and reverence, whose critics can be 
dismissed as “ill-spirited” (Goodhart and Astell 2011, 19; even if true, is that an 
argument?). Could the rest of us offer blanket assumptions and unsubstantiated 
generalizations, and then complain that our critics don’t “engage”? (cf. Goodhart and 
Astell 2011, 21). Could we defend our incompletely proven theories by asserting 
that the evidence has just been concealed here or went missing there? The guru 
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speaks, and rabbits are pulled from hats. His followers sing his praises, and object 
when critics are insufficiently “respectful” (Goodhart and Astell 2011, 19).  
I realize now that most of this is not a criticism of Girard at all. We scholars 
can have our heroes—indeed, we all should. But if we scholars can’t identify 
multiple instances where our academic heroes have erred, then something must be 
awry. Theories, once formulated, must be tested, probed and improved. When a 
theory claims universality while defying falsification, the appropriate response is 
not engagement, but resistance. We need not respect such theories any more than 
we must revere the gods.  
Mimetic theory’s only hope is to become, simultaneously, something more 
and less than what Girard made of it. As long as it claims to explain everything the 
rest of us will likely aver, more safely, that it really explains nothing. Only when it 
can admit what it cannot explain does it stand a chance of being taken seriously as a 
partial explanation of certain types of myths, and certain sacrificial rites. This is 
where there narrowing is needed. As for the needed expansion: As long as mimetic 
theory is associated with Girard above all, it cannot legitimately claim to be a 
broader mimetic theory. All of our major theories—structuralism and functionalism, 
to name two—have always resisted association with any single mind, Claude Lévi-
Strauss and Émile Durkheim notwithstanding. The most useful theories—like 
animals—are those that can be domesticated. 
 Not long after Violence and the Sacred first appeared—but with regard to 
very different set of discussions surrounding sacrifice—G. S. Kirk called for some 
middle ground between the ‘‘piecemeal’’ solutions that Mary Douglas was then 
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rejecting and the single-principle theories that she often espoused instead. What 
Kirk called for was ‘‘the careful re-statement of functionalism in relation to those 
accidents, confusions, syncretisms, and historical changes that make religion in 
particular, including its rituals and the practice of animal sacrifice not least of all, 
such a multifarious and often contradictory affair’’ (1980, 54).  
Looking to the future, mimetic theory should look to become toned-down, 
nuanced, and reformulated as a hypothetical dynamic by which competitive desire 
leads to violence in certain circumstances, perhaps eventually leading to sacrifice—
but again only when identifiable circumstances warrant. If this dynamic is to prove 
true, it should be testable. There will be overriding variables and conflicting 
contexts. At times, sacrifice need have nothing to do with it. The theory should hope 
to explain not what all sacrifice shares everywhere, but why certain variables are 
more visible in some contexts, and less apparent (or perhaps not present at all) in 
others. For this to happen, the Girardian scriptures at the heart of the theory will 
have to accept critical, but canonical, counterparts. From what I can see, this vision 
seems very far off in the future. 
Until then, maybe we should ask this: what if Mel Brooks’s Two Thousand 
and Thirteen year-old man was right? Isn’t it possible that the primal alpha-male—
let’s call him “Phil”—was in fact struck by lightning, everywhere? Well, maybe not. 
After all, we have to admit that we cannot prove that any primal alpha-male was 
ever struck by lightning, anywhere—just like we cannot prove the imaginary 
originary theories of Freud, or Frazer, or Girard. Brooks’s theory, in the end, has 
only one solid advantage over Girard’s: It’s funny. And the humor is revelatory: the 
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comedy exposes the otherwise concealed hubris at the heart of grandiose 
theoretical generalization. 
Girard’s theory, in the end, does have one solid (and very serious) advantage 
over Brooks’s and, indeed, many other theories. Years before the problem became 
obvious—back when secularization theories abounded—Girard had his eye on one 
question that looms so large now: the deep, dark, and disturbing nexus between 
religion and violence, between unquestioned belief and moral atrocity. Calling 
scholarly attention to an overlooked question is no minor achievement. Now we 
must bring ourselves to understand the complexity of the matter, lest we accept the 
belief that we already have an all-encompassing explanation.   
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